This is the third in a series of papers that deal with the problem of finding the optimal decision rules for n-period chance-constrained programming models. The first two papers in this series are entitled "OptimalDecision Rules for the E Model of Chance-Constrained Programming" and "Optimal Decision Rules for the Triangular E Model of Chance-Constrained Programming."
Introduction
This paper gives an application of the method of chance-constrained programming to a problem in financial planning. Such problems are particularly well suited to analysis by chance-constrained programming because they deal with questions of planning in the face of an uncertain future and are such that the chance elements enter into both the objective function and the constraints. These are precisely the kinds of problems that chance-constrained programming was designed to handle.
In most of the work done thus far in chance-constrained programming, problems have been solved by converting them into equivalent deterministic and, in general, nonlinear problems. This transformation has been accomplished chiefly by restricting the class of admissible decision rules to the class of linear decision rules. 1 " 3 Even purely deterministic models have proved useful in the analysis of problems of financial budgeting. Specifically, the work of Charnes, Cooper, and Miller 4 on the problem of the costing of funds in a simple warehouse model is mentioned. There in addition to the usual set of constraints in a warehouse model, is added a simple deterministic liquidity constraint requiring that the planned accumulation of cash be greater than or equal to the difference between tho minimum cash balance considered acceptable and the initial cash holdings.
The specific problem presented here is a two-period problem of planning for liquidity in a savings and loan association. The model used was first discussed by Charnes and Thore. 5 Their assumption was that the admissible class of decision rules was the class of linear rules. The deterministic equivalent was found and the resulting nonlinear programming problem was solved to get the optimal decision rules in terms of the parameters of the model.
The results presented in this paper differ from these in one extremely significant way. It is no longer assumed that the class of decision rules under consideration is linear. In particular, the decision rules will be arbitrary functions of the random observations and decision rules of previous periods, subject only to certain regularity conditions that permit the use of the isoperimetric theory of the calculus of variations. Thus the admissible class of decision rules in this formulation is much larger than the class of only linear rules.
In Charnes and Kirby* necessary conditions were developed for decision rules, restricted only to the class described above, to be optimal for the type of problem to be considered here. Most of the mathematical results in this paper will be based on the results contained in this paper.
It is shown that under certain circumstances the optimal decision rule in this class of feasible rules is, in fact, the optimal linear rule. The result is of particular importance because it shows that good reason exists, other than the fact that it is mathematically more manageable, for limiting oneself to finding the optimal linear decision rule.
It will also be shown that in all other cases (i.e., where the rule is not linear) the optimal rule is discontinuous. This result may seem to be highly surprising at first but by economic arguments it will be shown that it does, in fact, appear to be reasonable.
Description of the Model
To provide a background for subsequent mathematical treatment of the problem a brief description of the model with some remarks about its institutional setting will be given (Ref 5, .
The problem is planning for liquidity in a savings and loan association. There are several reasons why the association needs to provide voluntarily for liquidity. These include the fact that the assuciation must be ready to pay its savers the money that belongs to them on request. In other words the association must be prepared to handle withdrawals from its total savings capital.
At the same time a continuous flux exists in the mortgage-loan portfolio of an association owing to oeople requesting and receiving new loans, while a stream of repayments from outstanding mortgage loans brings funds back to the association. Hence in any period the association must have cash available to meet the excess of new loans over the stream of repayments.
These liquidity needs are usually met by the inflow of new savings and of mortgage-loan repayments. There are, however, other sources such as the stock liquidity, which is available by selling the US government securities contained in the association's stock portfolio. Cash can also be oltained by borrowing from both the Federal Home Loan Bank and commercial banks.
There are also legal restrictions on the amount of liquid assets that the association must hold. At the present time the required minimum ratio of cash plus US securities to savings capital is 7 percent. Thus, if an association wants to hold liquid assets, to be available in case of liquidity needs, it must hold liquid funds above this 7 percent requirement.
The problem can then be expressed as follows: Given the different needs for liquidity of a savings and loan association and given the different sources of liquidity available, how should the association choose between these alternative sources of funds in order to provide for the given needs of liquidity ?
In the very simple model discussed in this paper the essential feature is that the association holds only two types of assets: cash and loans. The association's liquid assets, cash, yield no earnings at all, and the illiquid assets, loans, yield earnings through the interest paid on them although they are perfectly illiquid. Thus the association is faced with a clear-cut choice between liquidity and profitabilicy.
Furthermore it is assumed that the making of new loans is a decision variable that is completely under the control of the association; i.e., there is perfect competition in the loan market so that the association can make any number of loans that it wishes on current standard terms.
The stochastic part of the model arises from the random variations of the savings capital of the association. The increase in withdrawable savings capital during period t will be treated as a random variable. This random variable can assume both positive and negative values. If it is positive, then more money has been deposited than withdrawn during that period, whereas if the random variable is negative the converse is true.
As we stated earlier the association needs free cash above the legalliquidity requirement to enable it to make new loans and to provide for savers who want to withdraw part of their investment. Although it is true that the association could borrow to obtain the cash it needs, there are certain chance-constrained limits on the frequency of such borrowing. Thus the problem is one of planning for liquidity in the face of the uncertain variations in savings capital, subject to the restriction that the association does not want to borrow too often.
To describe the model more rigorously the following notation is introduced: Let M -total cash held by the association L = mortgage loans S = the legal liquidity minimum S, = total withdrawable savings capital at time t i -dividend rate AS, -S ( -SJ.J (1 + i) = the increase in total withdrawable savings capital during period I above dividends credited to accounts (i.e., the net increase in savings in period t) l i = the new mortgage loans obtained by the association in period t M t = cash holdings at the end of period t a ( = annuities received during period t The assumption is that the frequency by which pr 0 payments of loans and complete loan payoff J occur in the total loan portfolio does not change over time. Assuming further that the association expects to charge a constan* rate of interest on its loans over time, the total amount of interest the loan l t will bring into the association over the life of the loan is Rl t , where R is the interest rate on loans.
Hence the entire interest earned by loans made during periods t -1,..., T is
It is assumed that the objective of the association is to maximize the expected interest accrued hy l t , t = 1,..., T, i.e., it is desired to maximize It is supposed that a known constant X exists such that the association is required by law to keep cash balances amounting to at least 100X percent of the total savings capital S. Moreover, borrowing is not allowed when the association holds cash above the legal minimum, i.e., when M, > XS,. It is also assumed that the association cannot and does not want to borrow too often and therefore needs to check the frequency of its borrowing. This leads to the liquidity constraint
where a t is some preassigned probability. The admissible class of decision rules-distribution of the random variables AS, will be discussed in a moment-is such tnat it allows I, to be negative. This shall be interpret^ i as term borrowing on the same length of time and with the same interest charge as given by the average term loan. It is assumed that such long-term borrowing cannot occur too frequently, therefore the constraint
where i3 t is a preassi^ned probability, is imposed on £,.
In each period (, t = 1,..., T, the budget constraint (balance-sheet identity) is V p (
This says that the sum of the cash holdings at the end of period t and the new loans made during period I must equal the sum of the initial cash held at the start of period t, the annuities received during period t, and the net inflow of new savings during period t above dividends credited to accounts. In brief, the left side of Eq 3 gives the use of funds in period t and the right side gives the total loanable funds that become available during period t.
Thus the problem is to maximize a Ri ) (4) subject to Eqs 1, 2, and 3.
Using the data given in Charnes and Thore 5 the following expressions were obtained for the annuities a l and a 2 , in the two-period problem T = 2 a, = 13,104 a 2 = 11,762 + 0.173^1 in millions of dollars.
Inserting these expressions into the budget constraint Eq 3 the following expressions for M, and M 2 are derived:
M, =-(,,+ AS, + 13,104 +M 0 M 2 = -0.827t, --t, 2 + AS, + AS 2 + 24,866 + M 0 . By substituting these expressions into the liquidity constraints Eo 1 the problem can be mathematically expressed as maximize EfHC, < RP 2 ) subject to
It is known from the definition of AS, that S, = AS, + S ( _ ,(1 + 0. Therefore, S, = AS, + (l + i)S ü and S,, = AS,, + (l + i)S, = AS 2 + (1+ i)AS, + (l + i) 2 S 0 , thus these expressions can be substituted into Eq 5. Moreover, since R > 0 and appears in the objective function as the coefficient of both t, and i, 2 , it can be dropped from the problem. Hence Eq 5 becomes maximize
and so Eq 6 can be written as maximize
In the development of the model thus far nothing has been said about what distributions will be assumed for the random variables AS, and AS 2 . In Charnes and Thore 5 it was assumed ihat LS,, t = 1, 2, were independent random variables each being normally distributed with mean E, and standard deviation 6,.
Because the following mathematical results are applicable for a fairly large class of random variables consideration at this time will not be limited to only normal random variables. Instead it is assumed that AS,, AS 2 are independent, continuous random variables with frequency functions fj(AS,), t -1, 2, and distribution functions F^AS,), t = 1, 2, respectively. It is assumed also that either dfo in 1 (HI and either
It is emphasized that conditions (a) and (b) do not restrict the distribution of ASp Hence AS, can be any continuous random variable. Since the 0 and 1 fractile points of a normal random variable are -~ and + « respectively, it can be seen that AS, and AS 2 , being normally distributed, are admissible random variables.
Mathematical Treatment
The problem now is solving Eq 8 for the optimal decision rules -t [ and tj. As is customary in « period problems in chance-constrained programming it is desired that the jth period decision rule be an explicit function of the random variables whose values will have been observed at the time the jth period decision rule is put into effect, but it is not a function of the random variables of the jth or future period.
2 » 8 » 7 Thus it is required that t 2 be such that l 2 = ^(AS,), i.e., t 2 is a function of A^, but not AS 2 . This agrees with the above requirement. Since the second-period decision l 2 must be made before the random variable AS 2 of the second period is observed, the knowledge of the observed value of AS, can be used in making the decision l 2 . Similarly it is required that i, be a zero-order rule (Ref 2), since l l is not to be an explicit function of either AS, or AS 2 .
The probability and the expectation will be computed in Eq 8 using the joint distribution of AS,, AS 2 . Hence
PI-0,827f, -P 2 (VS,) . ll -A(l t i)l VS, ^ (1 -A) VS 2 J K
where A is the set of points for which In order to solve Eq 9 assume that li is fixed and then proceed to find the optimal I2. namely, 12, in terms of t, and b,. Having found 12 put it into the objective function of Eq 9 to find EU-O in terms of l l and then solve the resulting problem for I,', the optimal value of t,.
Thus consider the problem maximize 
where D" satisfies 0 < D" < 1 and is a constant. From theorem? 8 it is known that a further necessary condition that t,'(bi) be defined by Eq 14 over any interval [y' z' ] in the optimal partition is that Fj HI) < + » and satisfy
The admissible class of random variables violates this inequality when FjHl) < + «; hence it is concluded that t^b,) is not given by Eq 14 for any interval in the optimal partition.
From theorem 8 8 a necessary condition that t^b,) be given by Eq 13 over some interval [y ' z'] in the optimal partition is that FjHO) >-«, and either fjlF^lO)] > TjjfF^1 (D*)), Again, it can be seen that the admissible class of random variables fails to satisfy these conditions. Therefore ^ i s not given by Eq 13 anywhere. Hence it has been shown, using the results in Charnes and Kirby 8 and the assumptions concerning the distributions of b, and b 2 , that a necessary condition that t^ b,) be optimal for Eq 10 is that there exists a partition of [g, h] where D' satisfies 0 < D* < 1 and D" is a constant. There are two possible cases, one in which the constraint P{l' 2 * 0) * ß 2 is binding and the other where it is not binding. In the latter case theorem 6 Charnes and Kirby 8 can be used to conclude that t'^b^ is not identically 0 over any interval in our optimal partition. Thus An examination of the first constraint of Eq 10 shows that it must be satisfied as an equality at the optimum. Otherwise, l' 2 (b,) could be increased for some value of b,, as the integrand of the constraint is a monotonic increasing function of l 2 , thus increasing the value of the objective function and therefore In Eq 16 the objective is obtained by using the expression for ^2 (bj) given in Eq 12 since it is only necessary to perform the integration over those intervals for which li, (b,) is not identically 0, i.e., for jel and je J. The first constraint of Eq 16 corresponds to the first constraint of Eq 10, except that it is written in such a way that it involves only the intervals ly i , z i ] for which jel and j ej. The second constraint says the P( V < 0) = 1 -02, which is true if and only if P(t 2 > 0) = ß 2 ; therefore it corresponds to the second constraint of Eq 10. The remaining conditions assure that a collection of nonoverlapping intervals will be secured such that l' 2 z 0 for jel and 1^0 for jej. The fact that l' 2 = 0 on at most a set of measure 0 in any of the intervals for jel and j ej is guaranteed by the fact that Equatior. 16 will now be solved using the Lagrange multiplier technique to derive necessary conditions for y,, z^ to be optimal for jd , je J. To do this begin by forming the Lagrangian function
ii,}ßln~-r : where Ä, n, TJ , ^.. 6,, ^p X., 9., are Lagrange multipliers and
The following equations and inequalities provide some necessary conditions that yl, zj maximize L and hence solve Eq 16. Let j. I Then dL/a z = 0 implies 
and BL/öyj = 0 implies
--0. 7j T j 0, j.l and j ( J,
|i-0 .-f ) R ) . 0, J.l and )( J.
. 2, -t-< 0 .<* ' 0. jrl and je],
From the expression Eq 12 for 1% in any interval [y,, Zj] for which je I, or jcj, it is seen that ^ is a straight line of positive slope as [1-X (1+ i)J> 0. Therefore if at some point,say bj, l^ (b,) > 0 then t'z (bj) a 0 for all b, :> b,. This conclusion follows directly from the geometry of the situation.
Let m be the smallest value of j for which l' 2 * 0 almost everywhere in [y , z ] . Then ^'^ 0 in all intervals [V, Zj] for which) a m. Similarly 1 2 s 0 in all intervals [y, , z ] for which j < m. Next, it is observed from Eq 21 that ^ ^ 0 -> T, = 0 -yj =2, from the equation öL/öTJ, =0. But yj = z, implies that Eq 16 could just as well be solved by dropping the value of j from the problem. So the assumption now is that rj j = 0 for all j.
Moreover from Eq 22 £ j+ i ;* 0 -RJU = 0 -y J + i =2, from the equation äL/d^j + 1 = 0. But when j ^ m it is known that li t 0-~l2 > 0, so that yj + i = 2J means that in the intervals [y,, 2j] Similarly it is assumed that 4, + j = 0 for j s m-2. Therefore the only 4j that can be nonzero is £ m .
Using an analogous argument the only öj that can be nonzero is 61,, and the only <£j that can be nonzero is 0^, where t is such that Zj s 2^, jc I, jc j, and k is such that yj * y k , jcl, jej. Now if jcI then ^j + , = 0, and if tj = 0 also, then Eq 17 implies that there is only one Zj for j el. This follows from the fact that the solution of the equation is unique, as F 2 is a monotonic function of 2j and it is known that Eq 17 must hold for all j c I. If 0j ^0 then j = I from the work above. Hence using äL/äP^ = 0 it is found that P^, = 0 -2^ = h from the equation a L/d<^ = 0, so again 2) is uniquely determined. Hence, there exists at most one interval [yj , Zj ]for jel.
Similarly by using Eq 20 and our definition of ö te , it is shown that there exists at most one interval [yj , 2j ] for jeJ.
Using the fact that I2 is a monotonic increasing function of bi in [yj', 2/ ], j el and je J, and that I, J contain at most one index j , it can be seen that the constraints restricting t 2 ' > 0, je I, and l'i * 0, je J, can, in fact, be replaced by tj > 0 when j = m, ^ < 0 when j = m -1, and (. 2 = 0 for j ^ m -1, m. Note also that it is necessary to have 6 m = 0, as 6 m / 0 -y m = g -j is empty, which is impossible since /32 / 0. Since Eq 16 is being solved for y', z' for j fI and jej, it is now only necessary to consider 
Putting this into Eq 18 with j = m, using the fact that ö m = 0, the result is
or Hence, the result is .' "
Using an analogous development by assuming that 6 m _ , =0 similar contradictions are derived and it is concluded that
It has already been shown that at most only one interval [y , 2 ] exists in I or j. So using the constraint that Lj f J IJiU, ) -^(y, )] = 1 -i9 2 , it is seen that J cannot be empty; hence y^., -g, z^_ x = F7
1 (1-8.,) . Therefore Moreover using Eqs 30 and 32 Eq 9 can be written as the following nonlinear problem in the three variables D 2 , y m , and l ] :
By solving Eq 33 and then putting /,,, D", and y^, into Eq 12 and using Eq 32 the optimal t', (b,) is derived. Hence Eq 9 has been solved.
Conclusions
It has been shown in the preceding section that when the constraint PU 2 s 0) ^ ß 2 is not binding the result is In order to give a brief interpretation of these linear rules write
where Vj, y2, T^i are constants and Ej is the mean of the random variable b, (i.e., AS,).
Since y 2 , = 1 -X (1+i) > 0, the optimal decision rule U' states that if there has been an inflow of savings during period 1 that exceeds the mean, free cash holdings during period 2 will be lowered by an amount y 2 i (b, -E]), as opposed to the case in which /. 2 is chosen to be a zero-order rule (i.e., t' 2 =v 2 ).
It is also clear from the solution that the holdings of free cash will be equal to their minimum values as long as these minimum values do not interfere with the limitations of long-term borrowing given by the i'{t l > 0) ^ ß l , t = 1, 2, constraints. When these constraints become binding the amount of free cash held will be greater than this minimum value. Thus the association's profits drop, owing to the loss in interest that would be obtained if less money were held and, consequently, more money loaned.
It is worth noting at this point that if Eq 5 were expanded to be a full n dimensional problem and if it were assumed that the constraints Pit, • 0) ß j = 1,... , n, are not binding then by theorem 6 in Charm s and Kirby 6 it can be seen that the optimal rule for l, will, in fact, be the optimal linear rule. This result certainly gives great justification for using linear decision rules in cases where the computation of the optimal decision rule from a much larger class of decision rules is extremely difficult to do.
Consider the case where the constraint PC _, -0) • /3 2 is binding. The first observation is that in this case l 2 is discontinuous. The fact that it must have at least one discontinuity follows directly from Eq 32, since it is known that ^m > ^T* ^ " ^ w hen P(-t 2 • 0) ■ 8 2 is binding. In general, however, t 2 will also be discontinuous at b, = Fj'(l-9.,). One way of understanding why f ' is discontinuous is by the following intuitive argument: suppose that when 5 L . = H l \ the optimal rule is linear, but it is discontinuous for all ß.-. ß\. Suppose that S_, is increased to ^2 = ß^ + e. It is known then that to get ' ! it is necessary to increase the measure of the set of points for which 1% * 0 where t" is the optimal rule when ß 2 -ß'l, i.e., l 0 2 must be increased for some values of h, to get t*. The 1 -a2 constraint being satisfied by (" as an equality means that 1% must also decrease for some values of b,, otherwise this constraint would be violated. If it is assumed that b^nd b 2 are N(E t , ö t ), I = 1, 2, random variables, it c^n be shown that the optimal linear rule when the jSo constraint is binding is where * is the distribution function of a N(0, 1) random variable. Now suppose that 8. 2 > % , then 4>'' (1 -i3 2 ) < 0, so that the slope of -t^ in Eq 34 is greater than the slope of 1 2 in Eq 32. This meanc that the optimal linear rule would recommend borrowing more when b, is very negative and lending more when b] is very positive than would the optimal rule given by Eq 32.
Conversely if S < l / 2 , the slope of Eq 34 is less than the slope of Eq 32 when l', i 0. In this case using the linear rule recommends borrowing less and lending less for small and large values of b, respectively, than would Eq 32.
In conclusion, there is one further reason for not being too surprised at the discontinuity of l' 2 under certain circumstances. Equation 10 can be regarded as a problem for finding the "optimal control" l 2 (b,).
8 From control theory it is known that in many cases the optimal control is discontinuous. It takes on one value for certain time intervals and then switches abruptly to another value. This is precisely what l 2 does. It is defined by Eq 32 for all values of b, in .((, Fj 1 (1 S> P, it then switches to f ' = 0 from Pf 1 (1 -^2) to y^ , and then switches again to the line defined by Eq 32. Thus l' n behaves similarly to the optimal controls in many control-theory problems.
